After Suzuki gave the war party--Umeda, Toyoda, and Anami--an opportunity to present their arguments against accepting the Byrnes Note, he asked the emperor to speak. [15], RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. If the Japanese decided to keep fighting, G-2 opined that Atomic bombs will not have a decisive effect in the next 30 days. Richard Frank has pointed out that this and other documents indicate that high level military figures remained unsure as to how close Japan really was to surrender. This update presents previously unpublished material and translations of difficult-to-find records. Third update - August 7, 2017, For more information, contact: Tsar Bomba | History, Location, Megatons, & Facts | Britannica For Eisenhowers statements, seeCrusade in Europe(Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), 443, andMandate for Change(Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), 312-313. For the maneuverings on August 9 and the role of thekokutai, see Hasegawa, 3-4, 205-214. Why America Dropped the Bomb - Commentary Magazine Seeing the bombing of Hiroshima as a sign of a worsening situation at home, Tagaki worried about further deterioration. Read more, The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War. Henry L. Stimson Papers (MS 465), Sterling Library, Yale University (reel 113) (microfilm at Library of Congress), Still interested in trying to find ways to warn Japan into surrender, this represents an attempt by Stimson before the Potsdam conference, to persuade Truman and Byrnes to agree to issue warnings to Japan prior to the use of the bomb. The non-specialist staff sent to observe these effects, their biased premise, and the markings on the documents all suggest that the report was from the beginning meant to anticipate and align with Stalins intention to downplay the importance of the United States atomic bomb while pushing the Soviet Unions own nuclear project forward. After reviewing the impact of various atomic bomb effects--blast, heat, flash radiation (prompt effects from gamma and neutron radiation), and radiation from radioactive substances--they concluded that it seems highly plausible that a great many persons were subjected to lethal and sub-lethal dosages of radiation in areas where direct blast effects were possibly non-lethal. It was probable, therefore, that radiation would produce increments to the death rate and even more probable that a great number of cases of sub-lethal exposures to radiation have been suffered.[74], RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. By the summer, once production plants would be at work, he proposed that the War Department take over the project. Ramsey, a physicist, served as deputy director of the bomb delivery group, Project Alberta. With direct access to the documents, readers may develop their own answers to the questions raised above. Willingness to accept even the destruction of the Army and Navy rather than surrender inspired the military coup that unfolded and failed during the night of 14 August. The task of compilation involved consultation of primary sources at the National Archives, mainly in Manhattan Project files held in the records of the Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, but also in the archival records of the National Security Agency. Moreover, the role of an invasion of Japan in U.S. planning remains a matter of debate, with some arguing that the bombings spared many thousands of American lives that otherwise would have been lost in an invasion. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 306-NT). For the early criticisms and their impact on Stimson and other former officials, see Barton J. Bernstein, Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,Diplomatic History17 (1993): 35-72, and James Hershberg,James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), 291-301. It is part of the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program. This made me feel: "This has really become a very difficult situation." Russia's participation in the war had long since been expected, but this does not mean that we had been well prepared for it. Document B: Thank God for the Atomic Bomb My division, like most of the ones transferred from Europe was . The discussion of weapons effects centered on blast damage models; radiation and other effects were overlooked. Besides material from the files of the Manhattan Project, this collection includes formerly Top Secret Ultra summaries and translations of Japanese diplomatic cable traffic intercepted under the Magic program. At the time, the American people cheered the . [7]. Compton raised doubts about the recommendations but urged Stimson to study the report. How familiar was President Truman with the concepts that led target planners chose major cities as targets? [36]. The question is: The Untied States decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post-Second-World-War era rather then a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional suuender. 5d (copy from microfilm), On 27 April, military officers and nuclear scientists met to discuss bombing techniques, criteria for target selection, and overall mission requirements. Truman was apparently not considering the fact that Tokyo was already devastated by fire bombing and that an atomic bombing would have killed the Emperor, which would have greatly complicated the process of surrender. [14], Firebombing raids on other cities followed Tokyo, including Osaka, Kobe, Yokahama, and Nagoya, but with fewer casualties (many civilians had fled the cities). On the morning of August 15, Hirohito broadcast the message to the nation (although he never used the word surrender). [21] An engineer for the Kellex Corporation, which was involved in the gas diffusion project to enrich uranium, Brewster recognized that the objective was fissile material for a weapon. [27]. Reasons Why the U.S. Were the Japanese ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped? When former Secretary of State Cordell Hull learned about it he outlined his objections to Byrnes, arguing that it might be better to wait the climax of allied bombing and Russias entry into the war. Byrnes was already inclined to reject that part of the draft, but Hulls argument may have reinforced his decision. Yonai made sure that Takagi understood his reasons for bringing the war to an end and why he believed that the atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war had made it easier for Japan to surrender. The documents cover multiple aspects of the bombings and their context. The Soviets had notified Japan's Ambassador to Moscow on the night of the eighth that the Soviet Union would be at war with Japan as of August 9th (Butow, pg. Cited in Barton J. Bernstein, Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the "Decision,The Journal of Military History62 (1998), at page 559. [14]. Eisenhower and McCloys Views on the Bombings and Atomic Weapons, National Security Archive [7], Documents 2A-B: Going Ahead with the Bomb, RG 227, Bush-Conant papers microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, "S-1 Historical File, Section II (1941-1942), The Manhattan Project never had an official charter establishing it and defining its mission, but these two documents are the functional equivalent of a charter, in terms of presidential approvals for the mission, not to mention for a huge budget. How much did top officials know about the radiation effects of the weapons? The documents can help readers to make up their own minds about long-standing controversies such as whether the first use of atomic weapons was justified, whether President Harry S. Truman had alternatives to atomic attacks for ending the war, and what the impact of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan was. Part II of the summary includes the rest of Togos 2 August cable which instructed Sato to do what he could to arrange an interview with Molotov. In 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Frightened by the rapid movement of Soviet forces into Manchuria and worried that the army might launch a coup, the peace party set in motion a plan to persuade Hirohito to meet with the cabinet and the Big Six to resolve the stalemate over the response to the Allies. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), This shows the "Little Boy" weapon in the pit ready for loading into the bomb bay of the Enola Gay. On Stimson, see Schaffer (1985), 179-180 and Malloy (2008), 54. For the distances, see Norris, 407. In writing to the Soviet leadership, Soviet Ambassador to Japan Iakov Malik included a nine-page report resulting from a trip to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by a group of staff members sent by the Soviet Embassy in September 1945. This personal account, written on Tinian, reports his fears about the danger of a nuclear accident, the confusion surrounding the Nagasaki attack, and early Air Force thinking about a nuclear strike force. atomic bomb dropped to intimidate russia. victor vescovo partner monika. For years debate has raged over whether the US was right to drop two atomic bombs on Japan during the final weeks of the Second World War. For discussion of the importance of this memorandum, see Sherwin, 126-127, and Hershberg, James B. Conant, 203-207. An illustration of a nuclear bomb exploding in a city. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), A "Fat Man" test unit being raised from the pit into the bomb bay of a B-29 for bombing practice during the weeks before the attack on Nagasaki. Did Truman authorize the use of atomic bombs for diplomatic-political reasons-- to intimidate the Soviets--or was his major goal to force Japan to surrender and bring the war to an early end? When the atomic bomb was dropped, I felt: "This is terrible." Immediately thereafter, it was reported Soviet Russia entered the war. The second, which hit Nagasaki on 9 August, killed around 50,000 people. For further consideration of Tokyo and more likely targets at the time, see Alex Wellerstein, Neglected Niigata,Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, 9 October 2015. But on 7 August, Stalin changed the instructions: the attack was to begin the next day. Whether Eisenhower expressed such reservations prior to Hiroshima will remain a matter of controversy. Russias annexation of Crimea in February 2014 escalated tensions between Washington and Moscow and changed the global perception of Russias role in international politics. Weapon Of Last Resort: How The Soviet Union Developed The World's Most Public Reaction to the Atomic Bomb and World Affairs, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, April 1947. Was The Atomic Bomb Used To Stop Soviet Expansion? Upon becoming president, Harry Truman learned of the Manhattan Project, a secret scientific effort to create an atomic bomb. What would happen if Putin unleashed a nuclear strike Still unaware of radiation effects, Truman emphasized the explosive yield. Some may associate this statement with one that Eisenhower later recalled making to Stimson. Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. [60], W.A. 7 (1), 340-341. The proposal has been characterized as the most comprehensive attempt by any American policymaker to leverage diplomacy in order to shorten the Pacific War. A blog of the History and Public Policy Program. 5g. We gave them fair warning and asked them to quit. With Japan close to capitulation, Truman asserted presidential control and ordered a halt to atomic bombings. Stimson had in mind a carefully timed warning delivered before the invasion of Japan. Contributors to the historical controversy have deployed the documents selected here to support their arguments about the first use of nuclear weapons and the end of World War II. Consistent with his earlier attempts, Stimson encouraged Truman to find ways to expedite Japans surrender by using kindness and tact and not treating them in the same way as the Germans. Atomic bomb question.pdf - The US decision to drop an "Little Boy" weighed about 9,000 pounds and had a yield approximating 15,000 tons of high explosives. The target would be a city--either Hiroshima, Kyoto (still on the list), or Niigata--but specific aiming points would not be specified at that time nor would industrial pin point targets because they were likely to be on the fringes a city. In August 1945 the USA detonated two atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That evening army officers tried to seize the palace and find Hirohitos recording, but the coup failed. On October 30, 1961, the Soviet Union tested the largest nuclear device ever created. Barton J. Bernstein, Introduction to Helen S. Hawkins et al. The controversy, especially the arguments made by Alperovitz and others about atomic diplomacy quickly became caught up in heated debates over Cold War revisionism. The controversy simmered over the years with major contributions by Martin Sherwin and Barton J. Bernstein but it became explosive during the mid-1990s when curators at the National Air and Space Museum met the wrath of the Air Force Association over a proposed historical exhibit on the Enola Gay. This photo was taken from the Red Cross Hospital Building about one mile from the bomb burst. For the extensive literature, see the references in J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan,Third Edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016) at 131-136, as well as Walkers, Recent Literature on Trumans Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground,Diplomatic History29 (April 2005): 311-334. Targeting Germany was rejected because the Germans were considered more likely to secure knowledge from a defective weapon than the Japanese. The timing of the trip to Hiroshima and Nagasaki within 40 days of the bombings illustrates the Soviet race to obtain its own atomic bomb, but the timing of the 2015 re-release of these documents is also significant: it came at a time when US-Russia relations were suffering a major deterioration. [29], According to accounts based on post-war recollections and interviews, during the meeting McCloy raised the possibility of winding up the war by guaranteeing the preservation of the emperor albeit as a constitutional monarch. To provide a fuller picture of the transition from U.S.-Japanese antagonism to reconciliation, the editor has done what could be done within time and resource constraints to present information on the activities and points of view of Japanese policymakers and diplomats. Despite its. The weekly illustrated magazine Asahi Graph also published a brief article on August 25 titled What is an atomic bomb?. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), An overview of the destruction of Hiroshima [undated, circa August-September 1945]. Frank and Hasegawa divide over the impact of the Soviet declaration of war, with Frank declaring that the Soviet intervention was significant but not decisive and Hasegawa arguing that the two atomic bombs were not sufficient to change the direction of Japanese diplomacy. Plainly Davies thought otherwise. Something went wrong. A collectionoftranscribed documents is Gene Dannens Atomic Bomb: Decision. For a print collection of documents, see Dennis Merrill ed.,Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume I: The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan(University Publications of America, 1995). [9], RG 77, Correspondence ("Top Secret") of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, file 25M. The British National Archives, Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FO 800/461. The National Security Archive is committed to digital accessibility. Therefore, it is hard to believe that by November 1945, the Japanese press had any detailed, spontaneous reporting of the effects of the atomic bomb. How the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of history Two scientists at Oak Ridges Health Division, Henshaw and Coveyou, saw a United Press report in the Knoxville News Sentinel about radiation sickness caused by the bombings. The initial report, May 1941, showed how leading American scientists grappled with the potential of nuclear energy for military purposes. Besides Truman, guests included New York Governor Thomas Dewey (Republican presidential candidate in 1944 and 1948), foreign ambassadors, members of the cabinet and the Supreme Court, the military high command, and various senators and representatives. editors,Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), xxx-xxv; Sherwin, 210-215. President Franklin Roosevelt called the attack a day which will live in infamy, and the American people were shocked and angered. For varied casualty figures cited by Truman and others after the war, see Walker,Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, 101-102. Historians have suggested a number of ways in which the atomic bomb might have alienated Stalin- 1. 576 words. a. Would the Soviet declaration of war have been enough to compel Tokyo to admit defeat? [13] According to the Foreword, the purpose of the raid, which dropped 1,665 tons of incendiary bombs, was to destroy industrial and strategic targets not to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations. Air Force planners, however, did not distinguish civilian workers from the industrial and strategic structures that they were trying to destroy. objectives. Eisenhowers son John cast doubts about the memoir statements, although he attested that when the general first learned about the bomb he was downcast. Since these issues will be subjects of hot debate for many more years, the Archive has once again refreshed its compilation of declassified U.S. government documents and translated Japanese records that first appeared on these pages in 2005. To produce material for any of those purposes required a capability to separate uranium isotopes in order to produce fissionable U-235. Tens of thousands were killed in the initial explosions and many more would later succumb to radiation poisoning. Library of Congress . For more recent contributions, see Sean Malloy,Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), Andrew Rotter,Hiroshima: The World's Bomb(New York: Oxford, 2008), Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko,The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War(New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008), Wilson D. Miscamble,The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). I am lost! Since the 1960s, when the declassification of important sources began, historians have engaged in vigorous debate over the bomb and the end of World War II. The warning would draw on the draft State-War proclamation to Japan; presumably, the one criticized by Hull (above) which included language about the emperor. Norris also noted that Trumans decision amounted to a decision not to override previous plans to use the bomb.[12], Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress), Record Group 200, Papers of General Leslie R. Groves, Correspondence 1941-1970, box 3, F, RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. Three days later, it dropped another on Nagasaki. More statistics and a detailed account of the raid is in Ronald Schaffer,Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 130-137. Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the point of no return in the history of world politics: they mark the dramatic culmination and end of the war, while symbolizing the beginning of an era of nuclear fear. Meanwhile, junior Army officers plotted a coup to thwart the plans for surrender. Did America drop the bomb in revenge, to prevent the USSR spreading? The dropping of two atomic bombs, the tremendous destruction caused by U.S. bombing, and the Soviet declaration of war notwithstanding, important elements of the Japanese Army were unwilling to yield, as was evident from intercepted messages dated 12 and 13 August. Library of Congress, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-36. In later years, those who knew both thought it unlikely that the general would have expressed misgivings about using the bomb to a civilian superior. President Truman, who ordered the bomb, defended it as a way to bring about surrender and save U.S. military lives that would have been lost in a ground invasion of Japan. Riabevs notes, it is possible that Berias copy of this letter ended up in Stalins papers. The U.S believed the bomb was the only way to send out a warning.When the bombs were dropped on Japan, it was world shocking news which was what the U.S wanted from the start. and offer details on potential protection (protective clothing against a uranium bomb includes rubber and any kind of insulation against electricity).